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As authors of a number of trailblazing peer-reviewed academic papers1, several books that 
push the boundaries on our understanding of Islamophobia2 including the books, 
Islamophobic hate crime3 and the first ever International Handbook of Islamophobia4, we 
have spent our whole academic careers, researching and investigating Islamophobic hate 
crimes.  Drawing on our extensive ground breaking research and empirical findings, we 
provide a brief outline below of some of our key findings from an evidenced-based approach 
on the drivers of Islamophobic hate crime. 
Introduction  
1. Islamophobic hate crimes send a message to the victim and the victim’s group 
members that they are neither safe nor welcome in the community or country. 
 
2. Islamophobic hate crimes can be one-off events or form part of a series of repeated 
and targeted offending. Evidence from our research studies indicate that many 
Islamophobic hate crime incidents form part of an ongoing process of victimisation. 
 
3. Islamophobic hate crimes often have a disproportionate impact on the victim on the 
basis that they are being targeted because of their identity. They therefore not only 
impact the individual victim but also the wider community to which the victim belongs.  
 
4. Whether one-off events or a series of repeated and targeted offending, Islamophobic 
hate crimes can send reverberations through communities as they reinforce 
established patterns of bias, prejudice and discrimination. 
 
5. In the British context, Islam and Muslims have increasingly been seen to be 
‘culturally dangerous’ and threatening the ‘British way of life’.  Muslims have been 
labelled as being both deviant and evil.   
 
6. The racialisation of crime has led to a drastic upsurge, following terrorist attacks.  
Islamophobia has now evolved into attacks against Muslim-looking people because 
of external factors such as their skin colour, facial hear and clothing.    
 
7. Victims of anti-Muslim incidents include not only Muslims but also anyone who looks 
like a Muslim or an Arab. Many non-Muslims such as Sikh men (with readily 
identifiable turbans and long beards) and Hindus, and many non-Arabs such as 
Indians, Pakistanis, and other South Asians are affected.  
 
8. Racism and Islamophobia are inextricably linked. Participants in our 2018 study 
noted how their appearances acted as a trigger for the types of hate and abuse they 
suffered.  For example, if they had a beard or were perceived to be from a Muslim 
background because of the way they looked then they were more likely to be 
targeted for racial abuse. 5  
 
9. The political rhetoric and sensational media reporting in the aftermath of Islamist 
terrorist attacks illustrates the ways in which Muslim identities can be transformed 
 
1 Professor Imran Awan, Birmingham City University profile: https://www.bcu.ac.uk/social-sciences/about-
us/staff/criminology-and-sociology/imran-awan 









across time and space. The effect of these transformations has been the construction 
of hate and fear, resulting in the rise in the level of Islamophobia through the 
construction of Muslims as synonymous with ‘deviance’, ‘un-Britishness’ and 
terrorism. 
 
10. Counter-terrorism measures have contributed to the ‘demonisation’ of Muslims in 
political, media and public discourses, portraying Islam and Muslims as a security 
‘threat’. A series of policies around securitisation and ‘tackling extremism’ have 
positioned all Muslims as a ‘suspect community’.6 
 
11. Islamophobic hate crimes and incidents often occur in public spaces such as streets, 
city centres and public transport networks. Common locations for these incidents also 
include shops, restaurants, gyms and other business environments accessed by 
members of the public, as well as surrounding public areas.7 
 
12. Rather than being single, one-off incidents, Islamophobic hate crimes can sometimes 
form part of an ongoing process of victimisation that often makes up part of a victim’s 
everyday experiences of hostility. A significant proportion of Islamophobic hate 
crimes are committed by perpetrators who are known to the victim such as 
neighbours, local community members, and even friends, carers, family members 
and work colleagues.8 
 
The visibility of Muslim identity 
13. Evidence shows that Islamophobia is highly gendered. Muslim women are more 
likely to be attacked or abused than men in public settings, particularly if they are 
visibly Muslim (for example, wearing Islamic clothing such as a headscarf, face veil, 
abaya), and the largest proportion of perpetrators remain white males.9 
 
14. The visual markers of Islam are the tools for identification upon which Islamophobia 
can be expressed. This approach demonstrates why certain individuals and groups 
are more likely to become targets for hostility than others.  
 
15. The veil ban across Europe stigmatises veiled Muslim women as ‘criminals’, thereby 
potentially ‘legitimising’ acts of violence towards them when they are seen in public. In 
this sense, the law increases the sense of vulnerability of veiled Muslim women in the 
public sphere. 
 
16. As such, the threat of Islamophobic hate crime has long-lasting effects for individual 
victims including making them afraid to leave their homes and feeling like ‘social 
lepers’ and ‘social outcasts’.10  
 
17. As a result a common sensation cited by veiled Muslim women is the panic attacks, 
worry, extreme anxiety and depression, which was said to derive from the fear of 







9 Zempi, I., 2014. Uncovering Islamophobia: The victimisation of veiled Muslim women. Leicester: University of 
Leicester. 




18. Muslim women are often reluctant to leave the house through fear of being attacked 
particularly on the street, in parks, in shops and on public transport. However, some 
veiled Muslim women described feeling like ‘prisoners in their own home’.  
 
‘Trigger’ Events 
19. The prevalence and severity of Islamophobic hate crimes are influenced by ‘trigger’ 
events of local, national and international significance.  
 
20. Islamophobic hate crimes increase following ‘trigger’ events as they operate to 
galvanise tensions and sentiments against the suspected perpetrators and groups 
associated with them. Evidence shows that Islamophobic hate crimes have increased 
significantly following ‘trigger’ attacks including terrorist attacks carried out by 




21. Social media companies such as Twitter and Facebook have been slow to react to 
the dangers posed by far-right groups and individuals who promote hate speech 
online.12   
 
22. Awan and Zempi found that online these impacts are both psychological, emotional 
and anxiety related.13  This is particularly strong when considering hate speech 
online that aims to threaten and incite violence.    
 
23. According to the typology of Islamophobic hate crime perpetrators on social media, 
first developed by Awan in 201414, there are eight ‘types’ of perpetrators These are; 
the trawler (someone who uses other people’s profiles to specifically abuse people 
online); the apprentice (someone who targets people with the help of more 
experienced online abusers); the disseminator (someone who shares malicious 
online communications); the impersonator (someone who uses a fake profile and 
account to target individuals); the accessory (someone who spreads 
misinformation); the reactive (someone who uses trigger events aimed at Muslims); 
the mover (someone who regularly changes their profile and victim) and finally, the 
professional (someone with a large following and is likely to have multiple social 
media accounts aimed at targeting Muslims). 
 
Individual impacts 
24. Being a victim of any kind of crime can have devastating and long-term impacts upon 
individuals including emotional, psychological, behavioural, physical and financial 
effects. However, victims who have been targeted on the basis of their perceived 
‘difference’ are likely to experience a host of negative emotions that are qualitatively 
distinct from those experienced following victimisation that is not motivated by hate or 
fear towards the ‘Other’.  
 
25. The emotional impacts of Islamophobic hate crime can be especially severe, with 









They are also more than likely to experience fear, difficulty sleeping, anxiety or panic 
attacks or depression. 
 
26. Victims’ responses to Islamophobic hate crime may include downplaying or perhaps 
denying parts of their self so as to reduce the potential risk for victimisation, which 
may lead to the ‘invisibility’ of certain identities.  
 
27. Actual and potential victims may attempt to make themselves as ‘invisible’ as 
possible to try and reduce the potential for abuse. A decision not to veil, a decision to 
reduce travel by foot and public transport, and a decision to avoid visiting specific 
public places, are all ways of trying to reduce the risk and manage the fear of 
Islamophobic victimisation.  
 
28. Experiences of Islamophobic victimisation impact upon the way in which Muslim 
women and men express their ‘Muslimness’ particularly in relation to their outward 
displays of faith, body presentation and dress. 
 
The Future of Islamophobia 
 
Address issues around social mobility 
 
29. Muslims are the most disadvantaged faith group in the labour market in the UK. 
According to Social Mobility Commission (2017), Muslims experience the greatest 
economic disadvantages than any other faith group in the UK.15  
 
The need to define Islamophobia 
30. The following is our working definition of Islamophobic hate crime which we 
recommend should be adopted by the British Government as a working definition of 
Islamophobia to assist policymakers, the police, CPS and victims of Islamophobic hate 
crime. Islamophobic hate crime is a: “A fear, prejudice and hatred of Muslims or non-
Muslim individuals that leads to provocation, hostility and intolerance by means of 
threatening, harassment, abuse, incitement and intimidation of Muslims and non-
Muslims, both in the online and offline world.  Motivated by institutional, ideological, 
political and religious hostility that transcends into structural and cultural racism which 
targets the symbols and markers of a being a Muslim.” 
 
Tackling community impacts 
31. As discussed above, Islamophobic hate crime may damage victims’ self-esteem, 
confidence and feelings of security far more than ‘normal’ crimes. In this regard, it is 
victims’ intrinsic identity that is targeted; something which is central to their sense of 
being and which they cannot or do not wish to change. However, the emotional, 
psychological and behavioural harms associated with Islamophobic hate crime are not 
restricted to victims; rather, the harm extends to the wider Muslim community, locally, 
nationally and globally. Correspondingly, the individual fear and vulnerability discussed 
earlier is accompanied by the collective fear and vulnerability of all Muslims, 
particularly those individuals who have a ‘visible’ Muslim identity. 
 





32. Evidence indicates that Islamophobic hate crime in Europe is on the rise.  Specifically, 
key findings from FRA’s (2017) second European Union Minorities and Discrimination 
Survey (EU-MIDIS II) include: Four out of 10 respondents (39%) reported being 
discriminated against in the five years before the survey because of their ethnic or 
immigrant background – including skin colour, ethnic origin or immigrant background, 
and religion or religious belief – in one or more areas of their daily lives, and one in 
four (25%) experienced this in the 12 months preceding the survey.  
 
Addressing how social media companies deal with Islamophobia 
33. A new cyber hate policy is much needed both at government level, social media and 
policing level which would be timely considering the recent spike of online 
Islamophobic abuse.  We propose using a new duty of care provided by social media 
companies and a traffic light system that enables deterrents for perpetrators online. 
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